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ABSTRACT 
The effects of a wage subsidy program on the duration of insured un­
employment are investigated using data from a demonstration project con­
ducted by the Illinois Department of Employment Security. UI claimants 
were offered a voucher that could be presented to potential employers as an 
inducement for their hire. Participation in the subsidy program was volun­
tary and eligibility was limited to a ten week period following the initial UI 
claim. In principle, the subsidy should increase the demand for the unem­
ployed worker's services by reducing an employer's net wage costs. It may 
also have supply effects if the expiration of eligibility for the subsidy causes 
an increase in search effort, though it is also possible that the subsidy causes 
workers to adjust their reservation wage levels upward. In practice, subsidies 
have stigmatic effects that tend to lower participation rates by high-skilled 
workers. As a result, participants in a subsidy program have longer aver­
age durations of unemployment than non-participants. However, correcting 
for self-selection, we find that wage subsidies can substantially increase a 
worker's probability of reemployment and that the net benefits of such a 
program exceed its cost. In addition, wage subsidies are compared to a 
search bonus proposal which is also cost effective, but, due to differences in 
participation patterns, has rather different effects. 
1. Introduction
Alternative Policies for Unemployment Insurance 
Jeffrey A. Dubin 
and 
Douglas Rivers 
Wage subsidies represent an efficient and relatively low-cost method for reducing
unemployment. In a wage subsidy program, job creation and hiring decisions remain 
the responsibility of private firms, though the cost is partially borne by government. 
Market incentives should promote the efficient allocation of resources and, when full 
employment is reached, subsidies can be reduced or eliminated without adverse con­
sequences. In contrast to alternative employment policies, such as job training and 
public sector employment, which are notoriously expensive and inflexible, subsidy 
costs are relatively low and can be adjusted to changing labor market conditions. 
Though in principle an attractive alternative to conventional unemployment poli­
cies, wage subsidies have been tried only rarely in the United States. Though the 
theoretical advantages of wage subsidies were recognized long ago by Pigou (1933) 
and Kaldor (1936), recent empirical studies (Burtless, 1985; Spiegelman and Wood­
bury, 1987) have raised questions about whether wage subsidies are a practical policy
for unemployment. Will workers utilize subsidies if they are available? Do subsidies 
have stigmatic effects which are harmful to recipients? Who recaptures the subsidy? 
That is, is the primary effect of a subsidy to lower an employer's net wage costs and 
increase labor demand (in which case the employer is the primary beneficiary) or to 
raise the wage a worker can command and increase labor supply (in which case the 
worker is the primary beneficiary)? To what degree can a well-designed subsidy pro­
gram mitigate the work: disi11cer1tives of the cl1rrent Une1nploy1T1ent I11sl1ra11ce (UI) 
system? Are wage subsidies cost-effective? 
The purpose of the present paper is to evaluate the efficacy of wage subsidies for 
Unemployment Insurance (UI) recipients using data from a demonstration project 
conducted by the Illinois Department of Employment Security (DES). We also dis­
cuss an alternative proposal-a search bonus-that was included in the Illinois UI 
experiment and that has received favorable notice (Spiegelman and Woodbury, 1987). 
A careful comparison of the two proposals indicates that the effects of each are quite 
different, though each appears cost effective. 
The paper is divided into seven sections. Section 2 briefl;r describes tl1e Illinois T_TI 
experiment and discusses both the advantages and limitations of data obtained from 
this experiment. We also identify some features of the Illinois experiment which have 
been neglected in prior analyses. Specifically, direct comparisons of experimental 
effects which ignore differential participation rates give a distorted picture of the 
impact of a subsidy program. Section 3 analyzes the utilization of wage subsidies 
based upon a simple signalling model. Sections 4 and 5 evaluate the impact of the 
subsidy and bonus programs on the duration of unemployment and reemployment 
earnings of program participants. Both the wage subsidy and search bonus programs 
have a positive impact, but upon different segments of the labor force. Section 6 
reports a series of simulation results on the costs and benefits of the programs for 
different individuals. Our econometric model permits precise quantitative estimates 
of program effects that are free from selectivity biases in program participation. 
2. Description of the Illinois UI Experiments
The data analyzed in this report come from a demonstration project conducted
by the Illinois Department of Employment Security in 1984 and 1985. A total of 
17,306 UI claimants in twenty-two DES offices between July 29, 1984, and November 
17, 1984, were randomly assigned to three experimental groups: a control group 
(who were granted their normal UI benefits), a wage subsidy group (who were offered 
a wage subsidy voucher in addition to their normal benefits), and a search bonus 
group (who were offered a search bonus in addition to their normal benefits). After 
completing a baseline survey, 5,205 claimants were eliminated because they did not 
meet criteria for participation in the experiment (discussed below), leaving a total 
of 12,101 experimental subjects. Table 1 summarizes the experimental design and 
outcome variables. 
The wage subsidy portion of the experiment consisted of a voucher that the subject 
could present to potential employers as an inducement for his or her hire. If the 
employer hired the claimant within ten weeks of the initial UI claim data and retained 
the claimant for at least four months (for thirty hours or more per week), the employer 
could submit the voucher for a payment of $500 from DES. The search bonus portion 
of the experiment had a similar structure, except that the payment was made to 
the claimant and no employer participation was involved. That is, claimants were 
not required (and presumably did not) inform employers of their participation in the 
experiment, and they, rather than the employer, submitted the voucher to DES and, 
in turn, received the $500 payment if they were employed for at least four months 
working thirty or more hours per week. 
Participation in the experiment was limited to persons between twenty and fifty­
four years of age filing initial UI claims who were entitled to a full twenty-six weeks of 
benefits. Excluded were workers on lay-off with a definite recall date, union members 
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Table 1: Summary of Illinois UI Experiments* 
Wage Search 
Control Subsidy Bonus 
Initial Claimants 3930 3953 4174 
Agreed to Participate 65.2% 84.2% 
Rehired Within 11 Weeks 54.5% 58.6% 59.4% 
Notice of Hire Submitted 5.0% 18.3% 
Voucher Paid 2.8% 13.7% 
who find jobs through a hiring hall, recent veterans, and federal employees. Thus, 
the experimental subjects were somewhat more homogeneous than the UI population, 
though, because of the exclusion of laid-off workers with recall dates, they were also 
somewhat more likely to experience longer unemployment spells. 
Experimental data are very valuable in determining the probable impact of alter­
native unemployment policies. Wage subsidies have both supply and demand effects 
that are difficult to sort out in nonexperimental data without making strong be­
havioral assumptions. Because the Illinois experiment actually implemented a wage 
subsidy and provided a comparable control group, the impact can be deduced directly 
by comparing control and treatment results. In fact, the DES contracted with the 
W. E. Up john Institute for Employment Research to provide an analysis of the ex­
perimental effects. The Upjohn report (Spiegelman and Woodbury, 1987) provides a 
careful analysis of the experimental results. It does not, however, attempt to model 
the economic behavior underlying the experimental responses; as a consequence, the 
interpretation of experimental effects and their implications on the choice between 
alternative unemployment policies remains an open issue. 
We should also acknowledge some shortcomings and limitations in the Illinois data. 
One limitation of the Illinois data is that some of the key variables for policy analysis 
are not measured. For example, the Up john report relies on the number of weeks of UI 
benefits collected by the claimant to construct its unemployment duration variable. 
ml l'fY> 1, 1 • 1 • 1 1 1 1 • , ,  , 1 • , 1 , , ,  ·• 1 1 ine mmcmty, wmcn 1s acKnow1eagea, 1s tnat once a c1a1mant exnausts tne available 
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benefits, continued unemployment cannot be distinguished from reemployment in the 
uncovered sector. Quarterly earnings, rather than actual wage rates, are reported 
so that the wage variables confound the effects of unemployment duration and the 
reemployment wage. We have constructed unemployment spell lengths using the 
rehire data and have modeled quarterly earnings as a function of months employed 
and to variables measuring productivity. Nonetheless, neither the spell length nor 
wage variables are as reliable as one might wish. 
There are also shortcomings in the experimental design. Subjects were informed 
of their assignment to treatment groups before they agreed to participate in the ex­
periment. About 16 percent of the search bonus group and 35 percent of the wage 
subsidy group declined to participate in the experiment. This difference is at least 
partially attributable to the same sort of self-selection that would occur if such a 
voluntary program were implemented on a wide scale, and, to the extent that this 
is the case, the estimated experimental effects would still be unbiased. However, full 
scale implementation would undoubtedly increase participation rates somewhat. We 
have explicitly modeled program participation, allowing us to simulate the effects of 
increased participation levels. Also, we show that participation is critical in deter­
mining the range and nature of effects caused by a wage subsidy program. These 
effects were not analyzed in the Upjohn report. 
The Illinois experiment also suffers from validity problems, particularly for an 
analysis of wage subsidies. Since the experiments were not publicized, the only way 
employers had of learning about the subsidy program was through the claimants 
themselves. This was not a problem in the search bonus experiment since no em­
ployer participation was required. In the wage subsidy experiment, there is evidence 
that claimants either were unable to explain the voucher to employers or chose not 
to inform them of their eligibility. In a full scale implementation, employers could 
be expected to be familiar with the wage subsidy program; so, the only reason for 
low utilization would be that claimants did not want to inform employers of their 
eligibility. We discuss these biases in Section 3 below. 
The choice of a $500 subsidy or bonus amount is rather arbitrary and makes 
fine-grained analysis of policy variations difficult. We are particularly interested in 
subsidy policies where the amount of subsidy varies among recipients. Our analysis 
also indicates that subsidy amounts larger than $500 could also be supported without 
incurring any additional net expense, but, of necessity, some of these calculations 
involve extrapolations. An experimental design with varying subsidy amounts would 
permit direct and more reliable cost calculation for these alternatives. 
Finally, the data have never been adequately cleaned. Some of the data (in-
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eluded in the Upjohn analyses) are clearly inconsistent. Rehire dates precede claim
dates, refile dates precede retire dates, and reported earnings are insufficient to qual­
ify claimants for the benefits recorded. These are among the problems we located. 
Because we did not have access to the raw data, we were unable to determine the 
source of these inconsistencies. Our method has been to eliminate the 44 cases of 
inconsistent rehire dates from the sample. The impact of this deletion is relatively 
slight, though not inconsequential for estimating experimental effects. The earnings 
and refile data are, in our opinion, more suspect and any analyses based on these 
must be treated as provisional. 
These reservations aside, we think that the Illinois data allow the most precise and 
reliable estimates of the impact of implementing wage subsidy programs. Ongoing 
data collection efforts will certainly modify some of the conclusions presented here, 
but the Illinois data provide a firm basis for a quantitative assessment of wage subsidy 
policies. 
3. Participation
Not everyone who was offered a wage subsidy or search bonus agreed to participate
in the program. There are a number a possible explanations for refusal to participate, 
ranging from inability to understand the programs to a possible "stigma" associated 
with being a subsidy recipient. A full-scale implementation of the program would 
reduce recipient confusion and uncertainty, but stigma effects, if they exist, might 
well remain. We focus our attention on the latter possibility. 
As can be seen from Table 1, participation rates were significantly lower in the 
wage subsidy experiment than in those of the search bonus experiment (65.2% versus 
84.2%). The wage subsidy is somewhat more complicated to explain, as it requires 
participation both by the claimant and the employer. For UI claimants to derive any 
benefit from the wage subsidy, they must persuade an employer that the subsidy can 
be used to offset their employment cost. For high wage workers, a small subsidy, such 
as that used in the experiment, might not be worth the bother. 
Burtless (1985) has argued forcefully that subsidies can sometimes have a negative 
impact on recipient's reemployment chances by identifying them as members of a low­
skill population which has been targeted for government assistance. Consequently, 
some members of the subsidized population may find it in their interest not to inform 
potential employers of their eligibility for a wage subsidy. This could account for 
the high refusal rates in the wage subsidy portion of the Illinois experiments. This 
possibility deserves closer examination. 
A simple theoretical model clarifies the informational content of wage subsidies in 
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a competitive labor market. We envision a situation in which there is a large number 
of potential employers a worker could approach for employment, but in which the 
employers could not directly observe a worker's productivity at the time of a hiring 
decision. We assume that employers know the average marginal revenue product m, 
of workers eligible for subsidies and mu of workers ineligible for subsidies, as well 
as the fraction p of workers eligible for subsidies. Let s denote the amount of the 
subsidy. If the worker identifies himself as being a member of the subsidy population, 
the employer would be willing to offer a wage of 
assuming employers are risk neutral. Suppose, however, that only a fraction Jr of 
subsidized workers identify themselves as being eligible for the wage subsidy. Then, 
the average marginal revenue product of job applicants without wage subsidies is: 
Wu(1C) = (1 - p)mu + p(l - Jr)m,. 1 - p1C 
In a competitive labor market, this is the amount that an employer would be willing 
to offer an unsubsidized worker if Jr were known. 
Since the subsidized worker decides whether or not to inform the employer of his 
or her eligibility for the wage subsidy before the employer makes a wage offer, we 
treat the worker as a Stackelberg leader. If s ;:: mu - m,, all subsidized workers will 
inform employers of their eligibility for the wage subsidy since w, > wu( Jr) for all 
0 :S Jr< 1. Ifs :S (1- p)(mu - m,), none of the subsidized workers inform employers 
of their eligibility since w, < wu(1C) for all 0 <Jr :S 1. In the intermediate case where 
(1- p)(mu - m,) < s <mu - m,, the subsidized workers play a mixed strategy giving 
the equilibrium utilization rate: 
_ s - (1 - p)(mu - m,) 
�-" . ps 
It follows that if is increasing ins and p and decreasing in mu -m,. From this analysis, 
a few simple conclusions can be drawn: First, the utilization rate is increasing in the 
amount of the subsidy. Second, if the difference in productivity levels between the 
unsubsidized and subsidized populations is large, the utilization rate will be lower. 
Third, if the population eligible to receive wage subsidies is large, the utilization rate 
will be higher. 
Utilization rates are unknown since some workers who agree to participate in the 
program may never inform potential employers of their eligibility for a wage subsidy. 
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However, non-participants are not supplied with vouchers and, hence, cannot possibly 
utilize the subsidy. Thus, we have chosen program participation as a proxy for utiliza­
tion. The analysis above indicates that the relevant variables determining utilization 
in a wage subsidy program are the amount of the subsidy relative to expected earn­
ings and demographic characteristics of recipients that might be associated with their 
market wage rates. Let ai be a dummy variable indicating whether the individual
agreed to participate in the program: 
ai = { � if subject i agreed to participate;otherwise. 
Let Ti = 0, 1, 2, or 3 denote which treatment group (control = 0, wage subsidy = 1, 
search bonus = 2) to which the individual was assigned and Zi a vector of individual
characteristics (sex, race, age, wage on last job, and UI benefit level). To explain pro­
gram participation given assignment to one of the treatment groups we have estimate 
binary logit models of the form: 
. exp(;3jzi) Pr(adri = J, zi) = (;3' ) 1 + exp ;z, 
(j = 1, 2)
The estimated logit models for participation in the two treatments are given in Table 
2. 
Participation rates are generally about 15 percent higher in the bonus experiment 
than in the subsidy experiment, as indicated by the larger value of the constant term 
in that equation. Hispanics were less likely to participate in either the subsidy or 
the bonus experiment. A study of earnings, benefits, and the remaining demographic 
indicators revealed that hispanics were about 8 percent less likely to participate in the 
bonus experiment and 18 percent less likely to participate in the subsidy experiment. 
Blacks were a bit less likely than whites to participate in the bonus experiment, but 
equally likely to participate in the subsidy experiment. Males were significantly more 
likely to participate in either experiment (by about 6 percent in the subsidy experi­
ment and 3 percent in the bonus experiment). The explanation for lower participation 
by minority group members is unclear. Finally, the lower participation rates of women 
might be attributable to the presence of other earners in the household, this situation 
tending to reduce the costs of extended job search. 
There is no significant impact of either base wage level (average weekly earnings 
in the two full quarters prior to initial filing of a UI claim) or weekly UI benefit level 
on the search bonus experiment. In the wage subsidy experiment, on the other hand, 
every additional $100 of weekly income in the base period reduces participation by 
about 2 percent. This fact provides some support for the stigma explanation advanced 
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Table 2: Logit Estimates of Program Participation Rates 
Wage Search 
Subsidy Bonus 
Constant 1.70 2.62 
(0.47) (0.59) 
Male 0.28 0.20 
(0.07) (0.09) 
Black -0.02 -0.45 
(0.08) (0.10) 
Hispanic -0.92 -0.75 
(0.12) (0.14) 
Log Age -0.12 -0.18 
(0.14) (0.17) 
Base Weekly Wage -0.08 -0.03 
(in $100s) (0.03) (0.04) 
Weekly Benefit Amount -0.41 0.26 
(in $100s) (0.12) (0.15) 
Log Likelihood -2491 -1795 
n 3953 4174 
Percent Correctly Predicted 66.3% 84.1% 
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above. High wage workers appear to be reluctant to utilize the subsidy offered. Base 
period earnings, however, have a much smaller effect on participation than do weekly 
UI benefit levels. The average UI benefit in our sample is approximately $120 with 
a standard deviation of $40. A $40 increase in weekly UI benefits causes nearly a 
10 percent decline in participation in the subsidy experiment. Contrast this effect to 
that observed in the search bonus experiment where the coefficient is positive (though 
not significant for p < 0.05). Wage subsidies are much more attractive to those with 
lower benefits. What little self-selection there is in the search bonus program does 
not screen out high earnings workers to any significant degree. 
4. Effects on Duration of Unemployment 
Both types of voucher were intended to encourage more intensive search on the 
part of UI claimants by making the voucher expire after eleven weeks. The other 
anticipated effect was that claimants in the treatment groups would be more likely 
to receive an acceptable wage offer in the early period of an unemployment spell and, 
consequently, experience a briefer duration of unemployment than members of the 
control group. The wage subsidy, for instance, should increase the amount employers 
are willing to offer the worker (since the $500 voucher payment could be used to 
offset increased labor costs) and, thus, it was anticipated, increase the chances the 
worker would receive an acceptable wage offer. The search bonus, on the other hand, 
encourages the worker to accept a lower wage than he or she might otherwise find 
acceptable, in exchange for the $500 voucher payment. In both cases, however, the 
effect would be the same: unemployment durations would be shortened and UI benefit 
costs would be reduced. 
Figure 1 displays the percentage of claimants in each treatment group rehired 
within the first thirty weeks of filing their initial UI claim. Control group members 
are the slowest to be rehired. The search bonus appears to have the largest aggregate 
impact, but these comparisons neglect the impact of participation rates and other 
variables. Econometric methods are used to estimate the effects of wage subsidies on 
duration of unemployment spells. 
Before turning to the econometric estimates, it is useful to consider the aggregate 
impact of the alternative programs, displayed in Table 3. The average length of a 
completed spell of unemployment in the control group is 13.7 weeks, compared to 12.7 
and 12.5 weeks in the wage subsidy and search bonus groups, respectively. Thus, both 
programs appear to have a fairly substantial impact on duration of unemployment 
relative to the control group, with a fairly similar reduction in each. The bottom 
row of Table 3 compares the percentage of claimants in each group who exhaust their 
UI benefits during their first spell of unemployment. The aim of each program is to 
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Table 3: Effects of Experimental Treatments 
Wage Search 
Control Subsidy Bonus 
Average Length of Completed 
Unemployment Spells (in Weeks) 13.7 
Percentage Exhausting UI 
Benefits in First Spell 42.1 
12.7 12.5 
40.3 38.2 
reduce this occurrence, and both programs appear to accomplish this to some extent. 
The search bonus fares best by this criterion, reducing the number of claimants who 
exhaust their benefits by 3.9 percent, compared to a reduction of 1.8 percent in the 
wage subsidy experiment. 
4.1. Econometric Methods 
In this section we describe the econometric approach that is used to estimate the 
effects of experimental treatments and participation on the duration of unemployment 
spells. 
In each period a worker is classified into one of two states: unemployed or em­
ployed. The basic idea is to specify a hazard function giving the probability that an 
unemployed individual becomes employed conditional on his or her past employment 
experiences and socio-economic characteristics. 
Let Yit denote the employment status of worker i in period t: 
Yit = { � if unemployed during period t; if employed during period t. 
The hazard at period t for a subject with treatment Ti = j is the conditional prob­
ability in which an unemployed worker in periods 1, ... , t - 1 becomes employed in 
period t: 
Pit = Pr(Yit = l IYi1 = · · · = Yi,t-1 = 0, Xi, Ti = j) 
- 1 
- 1 + exp(-atj - f3tjai -1jxi) 
where, as before, Xi is a vector of indi1lid11al characteristics thought to be related to 
chances of finding a new job. The period effects Citj are intended to capture dynamic 
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incentives created by the subsidy or bonus relative to the usual time pattern of escape 
rates found in the control group. The probability that an individual unemployed in 
period t fails to find a job in that period is 1 - P;,. 
The experimental design in the Illinois experiment guarantees that all UI claimants 
are eligible for a full twenty-six weeks of Federal benefits. Since we lack detailed 
information about prior employment histories, the eligibility criteria helps to reduce 
heterogeneity in out sample. We also control for wages in the period prior to the 
initial UI claim. 
Each worker in our sample becomes unemployed and eligible for benefits during 
either the second or third quarter of 1984. For workers filing their initial UI claims 
in the third quarter, the experimental period is taken to be the third and fourth 
quarters of 1984. For workers filing their initial UI claims in the fourth quarter, the 
experimental period is taken to be the fourth quarter of 1984 and the first quarter of 
1985. (Data is available through the third quarter of 1985, but we lacked confidence in 
the refile data for constructing longer term duration variables. Truncating the panel 
at six months makes the estimates less sensitive to outlying and probably unreliable 
observations.) We have estimated weekly, monthly, and quarterly models with roughly 
similar results, but will only report results using a monthly periodicity here. For each 
worker we calculate the number of months he or she is observed to be unemployed, 
denoted T;. T; takes on a maximum value of six months in our analysis and we 
simply record any individual whose spell of unemployment is longer than six months 
as a "censored" observation. Censoring occurs primarily because the panel is of fixed 
length so that the length of unemployment spells in progress at the end of the sampling 
period cannot be determined. Let c; denote the worker's employment status after T; 
periods of the unemployment spell: 
c; = r 0 if employed; l 1 if unemployed. 
Observations for which c; = 1 are censored, as the observed unemployment duration 
T; does not represent a completed spell. The treatment of censoring is quite important 
for analyzing the Illinois experimental data. Approximately 40 percent of observed 
spells are censored, and comparing average censored spell lengths (as in Spiegelman 
and Woodbury, 1987) can give biased estimates of the effects of treatments on duration 
of unemployment. 
It follows that the conditional probability of observing an unemployment spell of 
length T; which is either complete (Ci = 0) or censored ( c; = 0) is: 
Ti-1 
L;(Ti, c;) = P,'.r,Ci (1 - P;.T.)Ci II (1 - P,,) (1) 
t=l 
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From (1) we form the log likelihood for the full sample: 
n 
L = I )og Li(T;, c;) 
i::::l 
Maximizing L with respect to the unknown parameters (a, (3, 1) yields consistent 
and asymptotically normal estimates; optimization is undertaken using a Newton­
Raphson algorithm with optimal step-size. The large sample size, number of param­
eters to be estimated, and nonlinearity of the estimation problem make the analysis 
very computationally intensive. 
Once the parameters have been estimated, it is straightforward to obtain an esti­
mate of the expected amount of time individuals spend unemployed and their cumu­
lative probability of reemployment as a function of the duration of time unemployed. 
The probability of being reemployed after s periods of unemployment is given by: 
s-1 
Q;(s) = Pis IT (1 - P;,), (2) 
t=l 
so that the expected length of a (completed) unemployment spell for person i is given 
by: 
00 
E(T;jc; = 0) = 2=sQ;(s). (3) 
s=l 
Equations (2) and (3) will be used for simulation program benefits and cost in section 
6. 
4.2. Estimation Results 
The estimated duration models are presented in Table 4. The explanatory vari­
o hle<;;! �-nrl11rl,,,. +ho l ...... ... a .... ;+'hm .--f tho ;n,..1; ... ,;..-1 .. al's a�e ;n,11'ea+r..-... ... ,.a_,.;.,, hlas +�r blael,s ...._.._, ... '-' .L-'--'-'--'-'-.._._...._.._, V.l.l.V .LVS .L_1_U1-.l .11- 'JJ._ U.11-V .l LLI V .l\...LU .L 5 ' J .LU V UV.L V J..Lc:tlJ.LV .LV 1- Vil. ' 
hispanics, and males, base period wages (defined as the average weekly earnings in 
the two full quarters prior to the initial UI claim), a program participation variable 
(i.e., did the individual agree to participate in the wage subsidy and search bonus 
treatment groups), and the level of weekly benefits. The experimental participation 
variables and the weekly benefit variables are allowed to have two effects on the 
duration of unemployment, the first corresponding to the initial three months after 
the claim was filed and the second to the second three months after the claim was 
filed. The program incentives vanish after approximately three months. The first 
quarter agreement coefficient reflects additional incentive effect on participants rel­
ative to nonparticipants, while the second quarter agreement coefficient controls for 
unobserved attributes of participants relative to nonparticipants. Finally, we include 
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a set of period coefficients to capture pure time effects not explained by other vari­
ables. The duration models are presented separately for the control group and the 
experimental treatment groups in Table 4. To simplify the discussion, we interpret 
the coefficients in terms of percentage changes in hazard rates (holding the remaining 
variables at their mean values). 
The control group reveals that being older, black, or hispanic decreases the prob­
ability of becoming employed. Blacks are about 10 percent less likely to escape 
unemployment in any month than whites and hispanics are about 15 percent less 
likely to escape than whites. A one percent increase in age is accompanied by about 
a 7 percent decrease in monthly escape rates. The base period wage effect is positive 
and significant, though quite small, indicating a slight tendency for higher wage in­
dividuals to become employed sooner. Higher benefits levels decrease the probability 
of becoming employed at least in the first three months of the unemployment spell. 
In the first three months following a UI claim, a $20 increase in weekly UI benefit 
level is associated with a one percent decrease in the escape probability. However, as 
the claimant exhausts his or her UI benefits, this effect vanishes with no significant 
impact of benefit levels in the second quarter of the UI spell. The period effects reveal 
little clear pattern with the exception of larger revealed probabilities of escape in the 
early months. 
In the wage subsidy treatment group, a pattern of effects similar to that of the 
control group is found, with only a few exceptions. In this group, higher base period 
wages no longer increase the likelihood of becoming employed faster. The period 
effects take on a different pattern than in the control group and indicate a clear 
increase in the probability of becoming employed in the early periods. The differences 
in escape probabilities are as large as 15 percent between the second and six months 
of the unemployment spell. This corresponds well to the relationship shown in Figure 
1 which indicates higher reemployment probabilities throughout the unemployment 
spell. Finally, there are no apparent participation effects for the wage subsidy group. 
A comparison of the period coefficients of the control and wage subsidy groups in­
dicates that the early period escape rates are significantly higher for workers assigned 
to the subsidy group. If it were possible to match control and subsidy subjects on all 
relevant attributes, the duration of unemployment should be the same (on average) 
for comparable individuals. Since workers in the wage subsidy group, whether or 
not they agree to participate in the subsidy program, become employed significantly 
faster than the control group, it is apparent that those individuals who choose to 
participate in the subsidy program have had their spells of unemployment shortened 
relative to what they would have e.r,perienced if they had not been of ered the subsidy. 
Those who chose not to participate also have shorter durations of unemployment than 
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Table 4: Logistic Duration Models for Months Unemployed 
Wage Search 
Control Subsidy Bonus 
Male 0.07 -0.08 0.05 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Black -0.63 -0.61 0.63 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Hispanic -0.30 -0.32 0.31 
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09) 
Log Age -0.43 -0.46 -0.48 
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09) 
Base Weekly Wages 0.04 0.02 0.02 
(in $100s) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Weekly Benefit (in $100s) 
First Quarter -0.26 -0.29 -0.13 
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09) 
Second Quarter 0.04 0.16 0.28 
(0.12) (0.12) (0.11) 
Program Participation 
First Quarter 0.02 0.21 
(0.06) (0.08) 
Second Quarter -0.07 0.00 
(0.08) (0.10) 
Period Effects 
Month 1 -0.66 -0.28 -0.66 
(0.35) (0.34) (0.33) 
�v'.Ionth 2 0.06 0.42 0.22 
(0.35) (0.34) (0.33) 
Month 3 -0.07 0.27 -0.06 
(0.35) (0.34) (0.33) 
Month 4 -0.69 -0.49 -0.62 
(0.36) (0.35) (0.35) 
Month 5 -0.92 -0.61 -0.78 
(0.36) (0.35) (0.35) 
Month 6 -0.66 -0.66 -0.73 
(0.36) (0.36) (0.35) 
Log Likelihood -5970 -6216 -6659 
n 3930 3953 4174 
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the average person in the control group-not because of any treatment effect (since 
they clearly derived no benefit from the subsidy), but because they were more likely 
to find a job quickly. We lack adequate measures of their characteristics to control 
for these self-selection effects, but the estimated duration model shows that the wage 
subsidy must in fact be responsible for a higher reemployment rate among subsidy 
participants. 
Turning to the search bonus group we again see some differences relative to the 
control and wage subsidy groups. Notably, an increase in weekly benefits increases 
the likelihood of reemployment in the latter half of the sample period, as we found 
for both control and wage subsidy groups. We also see that those individuals who 
agree to participate in the search bonus experiment are more likely to become reem­
ployed sooner, and, in fact, that the bonus has practically eliminated the employment 
disincentive effects of UI benefits in the first quarter of the UI spell. Finally, the pe­
riod effects indicate that the search bonus group tends to have higher probabilities of 
reemployment in the early months following the claim data. Comparing the period 
coefficients across the groups (taking into account the mean effects of the nonperiod 
variables), we once again find that the treatment increases the probability of escaping 
unemployment, though the increase is slightly less for the search bonus than for the 
wage subsidy. 
5. Reemployment: Wages and Retention 
Both the wage subsidy and search bonus have been shown to shorten the duration 
of unemployment. What sort of jobs are found? Are wage levels affected? Do workers 
keep the jobs that they find? Since the length of time spent searching for employment 
is reduced by the subsidy and bonus programs, one possible effect of these programs 
might be to encourage workers to accept jobs for which they are not well-matched. 
Other things being equal, less time unemployed is desirable as workers' earnings will 
be greater, less v1ill be spent on unemployment compensation, and more tax revenue 
will be collected. However, these advantages would be offset if the jobs taken were to 
pay lower wages or are to be eventually lost. In this section we investigate program 
effects on reemployment earnings and retention rates. 
The two basic factors determining reemployment earnings during a period are 
the amount of time employed and, if employed, the wage rate. The amount of time 
employed in a post-treatment period (or equivalently the duration of an unemploy­
ment spell) was analyzed in the previous section. We now turn to an analysis of 
reemployment wages. 
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Table 5: Average Weekly Earnings in Base Period 
Agreed to Did not Agree All 
Participate to Participate Claimants 
Control 256 256 
Wage Subsidy 244 286 259 
Search Bonus 261 258 260 
n 6094 5963 12057 
F 13.4 13.5 0.5 
p <0.01 <0.01 0.61 
differences prior to the experiment. Table 5 exhibits the average weekly earnings of 
claimants in the two full quarters prior to their filing for unemployment compensa­
tion. Random assignment of treatments insures that base wages are approximately 
the same in each group (varying between $256 and $260 per week). However, agree­
ment to participate in the wage subsidy experiment is clearly related to base wages. 
Nonparticipants earn, on average, $42 more per week than participants. Note that 
participation is unrelated to base wages in the search bonus experiment. These dif­
ferences should be borne in mind when comparing post treatment earnings. 
Wages in the experimental period (the quarter in which the initial claim was filed 
and subsequent quarter) are shown in Table 6. Note that there is no significant wage 
effect in the search bonus experiment. Control group members earn, on average, $139 
per week, compared to $141 for nonparticipants in the bonus experiment, and $147 for 
participants. Contrary to expectations, availability of the search bonus does not cause 
unemployed workers to accept lower wages than they otherwise might. It appears that 
workers do not adjust their reservation wages but engage in more intensive search to 
collect the bonus. 
The wage subsidy results seem, at first glance, to be perverse. Subsidy partici­
pants fare worse than non-participants or control group members in terms of their 
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Table 6: Average Weekly Earnings in Experimental Period 
Agreed to Did not Agree All 
Participate to Participate Claimants 
Control 139 139 
Wage Subsidy 130 159 140 
Search Bonus 147 141 146 
n 5984 5828 11812 
F 16.5 9.2 2.8 
p <0.01 <0.01 0.06 
harmful, consider that subsidy non-participants earn significantly more ($159 per 
week on average) than either control group members ($139) or search bonus group 
members ($146). For one to believe that subsidies are harmful, one would have to 
simultaneously believe that refusing a subsidy somehow increases workers' wages rel­
ative to that of workers who were never offered a subsidy (the control group). This is 
entirely implausible. Fortunately, a simple explanation is available. In the base pe­
riod, nonparticipants in the subsidy program earned, on average, $42 (or 17 percent) 
more per week than participants. In the experimental period, nonparticipants earned 
$29 (or 22 percent) more per week. The correct interpretation of the earnings data is 
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Group means form a crude basis for comparison of treatment effects. To control 
for a variety of other variables, we estimated a set of regression equations relating 
experimental period earnings to the usual set of demographic variables, base period 
wages, months employed, and participation. Ordinary least squares ( OLS) estimates 
are displayed in Table 7. The demographic variables exhibit an odd assortment of 
effects which are not relevant to the discussion here and will be ignored. We focus on 
participation, employment, and base period wage effects. 
In all cases, as one would expect, earnings are determined primarily by amount 
<' , •  ' 1 fTH ' • • '  <' •l 1 1 '11 1 _ ' ] ' 01 time wor.Ked. ine interaction 01 montns unemp1oyea w1Ln uase per1ou wages 1s 
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Table 7: OLS Estimates of Average Weekly Wage Equation 
Wage Search 
Control Subsidy Bonus 
Constant -124.59 -121.82 30.94 
(26.17) (24.00) (31.13) 
Male 14.78 5.29 3.22 
(3.89) (3.58) ( 4.51) 
Black -5.80 0.05 0.25 
( 4.38) ( 4.09) (5.18) 
Hispanic -11.49 -5.50 6.67 
(7.23) (6.68) (8.50) 
Log Age 33.59 6.84 5.75 
(7.51) (5.30) (8.79) 
Base Weekly Wage 0.31 0.28 -0.32 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Months Unemployed 18.62 18.98 5.61 
(2.14) (1.84) (2.37) 
Months Unemployed x 0.05 0.06 0.11 
Base Weekly Wage (0.01) (0.01) ( 0.01) 
Participation Dummy -11.86 -3.13 
(3.67) (6.00) 
R2 0.39 0.39 0.41 
n 3843 3866 4103 
S.E.R. 116.79 111.10 138.93 
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included to capture the effect which shows that the benefits of employment (in terms 
of gross earnings) are greatest for those who can command the highest wages. It 
is interesting to note that the relationship between base and experimental period 
wages is strongest in the search bonus group. The regression estimates also indicate 
a significant participation effect: wage subsidy participants earn, on average, about 
$12 less per week in the experimental period. 
The previous discussion indicates, however, that subsidy participants can expect 
to have longer unemployment durations for reasons unrelated to the subsidy itself. 
The correct procedure is to treat months employed as an endogenous variable and 
to apply an instrumental variables (IV) estimation procedure. (In addition to the 
included endogenous variables, the predicted duration from the duration models in 
Table 4 was used as an instrumental variables.) These estimates are presented in 
Table 8. 
The IV estimates also show very large effects of months employed on experimental 
period earnings, as well as small effects (though still significant) of participation on 
experimental period earnings. These estimates will be used to produce the simulation 
results reported in the next section. 
The results to this point indicate little or no adverse effects of either the wage 
subsidy or search bonus program on post-treatment earnings. Perhaps, it might be 
argued, that although workers in the treatment groups were able to find jobs with 
satisfactory wage rates, they were still not well-matched to the jobs found and would 
eventually be laid off again. This turns out not to be the case. The data in Table 
9 indicate no significant differences between the groups in the percentage of rehired 
workers who subsequently refile for UI benefits (by the August 31, 1985, when data 
collection was terminated). In fact, the refile rates are considerably lower (about 24 
percent) in cases where the voucher was paid, versus about 42 percent for the entire 
sample. The experimental data provide no evidence that the churning of vvorkers is 
a serious or even minor problem. 
6. Cost-Benefit Analysis 
The evidence presented in the preceding sections demonstrates that the availability 
of wage subsidies decreases the expected duration of unemployment spells without any 
adverse effects on reemployment wages and retention rates. These findings, while at 
variance with some prior research on wage subsidies, are not themselves enough to 
justify adoption of a subsidy program. This section provides a cost-benefit analysis 
of wage subsidies and search bonuses. 
Both the wage subsidy and search bonus treatments lead to a reduction in UI 
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Table 8: IV Estimates of Average Weekly Wage Equation 
Wage Search 
Control Subsidy Bonus 
Constant -115.63 -106.30 64.84 
(29.76) (28.86) (39. 72) 
Male 13.51 5.90 -1.36 
(3.96) (3.72) ( 4.92) 
Black -4.17 1.95 2.74 
(4.60) ( 4.53) ( 6.01) 
Hispanic -10.02 -4.23 6.31 
(7.32) (6.97) (9.23) 
Log Age 34.20 40.92 0.94 
(7.59) (7.22) (9.71) 
Base Weekly Wage 0.22 0.09 -0.06 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
Months Employed 13.54 3.98 -39. 75 
(6.08) (5.84) (7.44) 
Months Unemployed X 0.09 0.15 0.32 
Base Weekly Wage (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Participation During -11.59 -8.31 
(3.81) ( 6.54) 
R2 0.40 0.43 0.31 
n 3843 3866 4103 
Standard Error 116.01 107.07 150.56 
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Table 9: UI Refiling Rates 
Wage Search 
Control Subsidy Bonus 
UI Claimants 41.9% 42.8% 41.4% 
(2240) (2341) (2565) 
Non participants 43.4% 43.3% 
(820) (379) 
Participants 42.5% 41.0% 
(1521) (2186) 
Voucher Paid 24.1% 23.7% 
(112) (566) 
benefits paid during the first spell of unemployment, as noted by Spiegelman and 
Woodbury (1987). In the control group, each claimant was paid an average of $2,279 
during their first spell of unemployment. An average decrease of $115 was observed 
for wage subsidy recipients compared to a reduction of $199 in the search bonus 
group (see Table 10). Both reductions are statistically significant. However, these 
calculations mask important differences between participants and nonparticipants in 
the experiments. When we control for agreement to participate, we find no significant 
differences between the wage subsidy and search bonus groups. For nonparticipants, 
the average total UI benefit varies in a narrow interval between $2,204 and $2,287. For 
participants in each of the experimental treatment groups, the average total TJI benefit 
ranges between $2,057 and $2,099. A reduction in UI benefit payments results only 
if the claimant agrees to participate in one of the programs; nonparticipants, on the 
other hand, receive about the same amount of UI benefits as control group members. 
Once participation is taken into account, both the wage subsidy and search bonus 
appear to be equally effective in reducing UI benefit payments. 
Spiegelman and Woodbury (1987) argued that the proper comparison between 
the groups is not first spell UI benefits, but over a longer period, such as the entire 
year following the initial UI claim. The logic of their argument is that the subsidy or 
bonus could encourage workers to take jobs for which they are not well-matched. As 
a consequence, subsidy or bonus recipients might be more likely to lose the jobs they 
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Table 10: Average UI Benefits During First Spell 
Participants Nonparticipants All Recipients 
Control $2,279 $2,279 
Wage Subsidy $2,099 $2,287 $2,164 
Search Bonus $2,057 $2,204 $2,080 
F 0.60 0.88 13.57 
n 6094 5963 12057 
p 0.35 0.55 < 0.01 
take and to refile for unemployment later in the year. The authors cite as evidence in 
support of this claim data similar to that in Table 11. In comparing total UI benefits 
over the year following the initial UI claim, we find the same ranking as before: control 
group members receive the most ($2,491 ), followed by the subsidy group ($2,427) and 
the bonus group ($2,329). The difference between the control and bonus groups is 
significant, but that between the control and subsidy group is not. Spiegelman and 
Woodbury conclude on the basis of this evidence that a wage subsidy would not be 
effective in reducing UI payments. 
This conclusion, however, neglects the difference in participation rates. Among 
claimants who agreed to participate in either the wage subsidy or search bonus pro­
gram, there is no significant difference in benefits paid during the claim year. The 
average total benefit paid to subsidy participants was $2,349 compared to $2,309 for 
bonus recipients. (The difference is too small reject a hypothesis of no difference.) 
Similarly, among nonrecipients the differences are also insignificant. These results on 
benefit payments are consistent with our earlier finding that treatment (subsidy or 
bonus) is unrelated to refiling rates. 
Lower participation rates mean that the potential total benefits from the subsidy 
program are smaller than those from the search bonus program, but benefits con­
stitute only one side of the cost-benefit ledger. The subsidy program is much less 
costly than the search bonus program in terms of the costs of subsidies or bonuses 
paid. Over one third of the claimants assigned to the subsidy program decline to 
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Table 11: Average UI Benefits Over Benefit Year 
Participants Nonparticipants All Recipients 
Control $2,491 $2,491 
Wage Subsidy $2,349 $2,574 $2,427 
Search Bonus $2,309 $2,439 $2,329 
F 0.85 1.74 9.37 
n 6094 5963 12057 
p 0.36 0.18 < 0.01 
participate, greatly reducing the potential costs of the program as well. In fact, the 
per-claimant cost of the wage subsidy is only $14, compared to $68 for the search 
bonus. Thus, average net benefits of both programs are positive and relatively simi­
lar. 
The interaction of participation rates with costs and benefits, however, is more 
complex than the above discussion would suggest. The participation decision should 
be treated as endogenous. As we have shown in section 3, nonparticipants in the 
wage subsidy experiments tend to have higher base wages and benefit rates than 
nonparticipants. Self-selection tends to produce a population of subsidy participants 
who have longer than normal unemployment durations. Those who decline to partic­
ipate do so because they expect to find a job fairly quickly and believe the subsidy 
would be of little or no help in finding new employment. If these same individuals 
were offered a search bonus, they would be likely to participate and collect the bonus 
without any change in their search behavior. In this sense, the lower participation 
rates of the wage subsidy program are a desirable feature. V/age subsidies tend to be 
most effective for those with longer expected durations of unemployment, lower base 
wages, and benefit amounts. 
The wage subsidy and search bonus programs, we have argued, have rather differ­
ent effects on different segments of the labor market. To analyze these effects more 
closely and to determine the net costs or savings that arise in each case, a series 
of r11odel sirr1ulationr:; were cor1<lucted. T11e sirr1ulatio:ns below vary race (black a11d 
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white), sex (female and male), and UI benefit levels ($80, $120, and $160, correspond­
ing to the mean benefit level plus or minus one standard deviation; Illinois UI benefits 
were capped at $160, so this value also represents the maximum possible payment.). 
For each simulation, age and base period earnings were set equal to the sample mean 
value for individuals of the same race and sex. 
The first step in producing a cost-benefit analysis is to simulate the response 
of various typical workers to the alternative programs. Equation (2) was used to 
compute monthly escape probabilities, which are displayed in Tables 12a-d. For each 
month we have calculated an escape (or rehire) probability giving the fraction of 
workers who would be expected to find jobs that month. For example, 5 percent of 
the black females receiving an $80 weekly UI benefit would be expected to find a job 
in the same month in which they initially filed their UI claim. We have also calculated 
the cumulative fraction of workers in each category who would have found jobs after 
a certain number of months. To continue the previous example, in the month after 
their initial UI claim, about 15 percent of black females receiving $80 in weekly UI 
benefits would be reemployed: 5 percent found their jobs in the first month, and 10 
percent of the 95 percent remaining unemployed after the first month would find jobs 
in the second month. 
The typical pattern in all of the simulations is that escape probabilities are higher 
in the earlier stages of unemployment spells if either the wage subsidy or search bonus 
program is adopted. Eventually, the cumulative probability of being rehired levels 
off, with similar (though usually slightly higher in the bonus group and lower in 
the control group) values under each of the programs. The programs would affect 
the aggregate unemployment rate by reducing the amount of time each unemployed 
worker would spend unemployed. 
The effects of the programs are largest for black females. Throughout most of 
simulation period, the subsidy and bonus programs reduce unemployment by bet1iveen 
5 percent and 6 percent. For black males, the reduction is typically between 2 percent 
and 3 percent, though for high benefit levels the search bonus can have a larger impact 
(in the neighborhood of 5 percent). 
In the case of white females, the wage subsidy is more effective at lower levels 
of UI and the search bonus at higher levels. At the $80 weekly benefit level, the 
search bonus reduces unemployment (relative to the current system, represented by 
the control group) by about 4 percent, while the wage subsidy reduces unemployment 
by about 6 percent. At the maximum benefit level ($160), the search bonus reduces 
unemployment by nearly 9 percent, compared to a 7 percent reduction for the wage 
subsidy. A similar pattern, though typically with smaller reductions, is observed for 
24 
Table 12: Simulated Unemployment Durations-Black Female 
Control Wage Subsidy Search Bonus 
Rehire Cumulative Rehire Cumulative Rehire Cumulative 
Month Probability Probability Probability Probability Probability Probability 
$80 Benefit 
1 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.05 
2 0.10 0.15 0.12 0.18 0.12 0.17 
3 0.09 0.22 0.11 0.27 0.10 0.25 
4 0.06 0.27 0.07 0.32 0.07 0.30 
5 0.05 0.31 0.06 0.37 0.06 0.34 
6 0.06 0.35 0.06 0.41 0.06 0.38 
$120 Benefit 
1 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 
2 0.09 0.13 0.11 0.16 0.12 0.16 
3 0.08 0.20 0.10 0.25 0.09 0.24 
4 0.06 0.25 0.08 0.30 0.07 0.30 
5 0.05 0.29 0.07 0.35 0.06 0.34 
6 0.06 0.34 0.06 0.39 0.07 0.38 
$160 Benefit 
1 0.04 0.06 I 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 2 I 0.08 0.12 0.10 0.15 0.11 0.16 
3 0.07 0.18 0.09 0.22 0.09 0.23 
4 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.29 0.08 0.29 
5 0.05 0.28 0.07 0.34 0.07 0.34 
6 0.07 0.32 0.07 0.38 0.07 0.39 
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Table 13: Simulated Unemployment Durations-Black Male 
Control Wage Subsidy Search Bonus 
Rehire Cumulative Rehire Cumulative Rehire Cumulative 
Month Probability Probability Probability Probability Probability Probability 
$80 Benefit 
1 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
2 0 . 1 1  0.16 0.12 0.17 0.17 0 . 18 
3 0.09 0.24 0.10 0.26 0.10 0.26 
4 0.07 0.29 0.07 0.31 0.07 0.32 
5 0.05 0.33 0.06 0.35 0.06 0.36 
6 0.07 0.37 0.06 0.38 0.06 0.40 
$120 Benefit 
1 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
2 0.10 0.14 0 . 1 1  0.16 0.12 0.17 
3 0.09 0.22 0.09 0.23 0.10 0.25 
4 0.07 0.27 0.07 0.29 0.08 0.31 
5 0.05 0.31 0.06 0.33 0.07 0.36 
6 0.07 0.36 0.06 0.37 0.07 0.40 
$160 Benefit 
1 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
2 I 0.09 0.13 0.10 0.14 0.12 0.16 
3 0.08 0.20 0.08 0.21 0.09 0.24 
4 0.07 0.25 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.31 
5 0.06 0.29 0.07 0.32 0.07 0.36 
6 0.07 0.34 0.06 0.36 0.08 0.41 
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Table 14: Simulated Unemployment Durations-White Female 
Control Wage Subsidy Search Bonus 
Rehire Cumulative Rehire Cumulative Rehire Cumulative 
Month Probability Probability Probability Probability Probability Probability 
$80 Benefit 
1 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.10 
2 0.17 0.25 0.21 0.30 0.21 0.29 
3 0.15 0.37 0.18 0.43 0.17 0.41 
4 0.11 0.44 0.12 0.50 0.12 0.48 
5 0.09 0.49 0.11 0.56 0.10 0.53 
6 0.11 0.55 0.11 0.60 0.11 0.58 
$120 Benefit 
1 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.10 0 . 10 
2 0.16 0.23 0.19 0.27 0.20 0.28 
3 0.14 0.34 0.17 0.40 0.16 0.40 
4 0 .11  0.41 0.13 0.47 0.13 0.48 
5 0.09 0.47 0.12 0.54 0 .11  0.53 
6 0.12 0.53 0.11 0.59 0.12 0.59 
$160 Benefit 
1 0.08 0.08 I 0.09 0.09 I 0.09 0.09 
2 0.14 0.21 0.17 0.25 0.20 0.27 
3 0.13 0.31 0.15 0.37 0.15 0.30 
4 0.11 0.39 0.14 0.45 0.14 0.47 
5 0.09 0.45 0.13 0.52 0.13 0.54 
6 0.12 0.51 0.12 0.58 0.13 0.60 
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Table 15: Simulated Unemployment Durations�White Male 
Control Wage Subsidy Search Bonus 
Rehire Cumulative Rehire Cumulative Rehire Cumulative 
Month Probability Probability Probability Probability Probability Probability 
$80 Benefit 
1 0.10 0.10 0 . 1 1  0 . 1 1  0 . 1 1  0 . 1 1  
2 0.19 0.27 0.20 0.28 0.23 0.31 
3 0.17 0.39 0.18 0.41 0.18 0.43 
4 0.12 0.42 0.12 0.48 0.13 0.50 
5 0.10 0.52 0 . 1 1  0.54 0 . 1 1  0.56 
6 0.13 0.58 0.10 0.58 0 . 1 1  0.61 
$120 Benefit 
1 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
2 0.17 0.25 0.18 0.26 0.22 0.30 
3 0.15 0.37 0.16 0.38 0 . 1 7  0.42 
4 0.12 0.44 0.13 0.46 0.14 0.50 
5 0.10 0.50 0.11 0.52 0.12 0.56 
6 0.13 0.56 0 . 1 1  0.57 0.13 0.61 
$160 Benefit 
1 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10 
2 0.16 0.23 0.16 0.24 0.21 0.28 
3 0.14 0.34 0.15 0.35 0.16 0.40 
4 0.13 0.43 0.13 0.44 0.15 0.49 
5 0.10 0.48 0.12 0.50 0.13 0.56 
6 0.13 0.55 0 . 1 1  0.56 0.14 0.62 
white males. 
The costs of either program are straightforward to compute. One calculates 
the percentage of workers hired within the first three months (approximately eleven 
weeks) of the initial UI claim date, multiplied by the takeup rate, to determined the 
probability of collecting the subsidy or bonus. To compute the cost of UI benefits 
paid under each program, we have calculated the expected number of months unem­
ployed (up to a maximum of six months) and multiplied this number by the assumed 
UI benefit level. Last, to the extent that these programs reduce unemployment, they 
will increase tax revenues through payroll taxes and state and federal income taxes. 
We have no data on marginal tax rates for subjects in the Illinois experiment, so, to 
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Table 16: Cost-Benefit Analysis-Black Female 
Control Wage Subsidy Search Bonus 
$80 Benefit 
UI Benefits 1584 1491 1530 
Subsidy /Bonus 52 75 
Tax Collections 503 509 477 
Net Cost 1082 1034 1 128 
Savings 47 -47 
$120 Benefit 
UI Benefits 2419 2285 2307 
Subsidy /Bonus 45 70 
Tax Collections 510 518 479 
Net Cost 1909 1811 1898 
Savings 98 1 1  
$160 Benefit 
UI Benefits 3277 3104 3087 
Subsidy /Bonus 38 65 
Tax Collections 516 527 481 
Net Cost 2761 2615 2672 
Savings 146 89 
be on the conservative side, we have assumed a marginal tax rate of 10 percent. For 
each simulation we have computed the expected gross earnings, conditional on months 
employed, and applied the tax rate to this quantity. Net costs over a six month period - - - - -
are equal to UI benefits paid plus subsidy or bonus costs, less tax collections. The 
savings (which may be negative) resulting from each program are calculated relative 
to the current system (control group). The results of these simulations are presented 
in Tables 13a-d. 
Though in most of the cases both programs result in net savings, the savings are 
far from uniform. The $500 search bonus is very cost effective at higher benefit levels, 
especially for white males (where average savings of $167 per claimant were found). 
On the other hand, at lower benefit levels the search bonus can actually end up losing 
money, as in the case of female workers (with the bonus costing between $4 7 and $69 
more per claimant than the current system). 
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Table 17: Cost-Benefit Analysis-Black Male 
Control Wage Subsidy Search Bonus 
$80 Benefit 
UI Benefits 1553 1520 1506 
Subsidy /Bonus 53 82 
Tax Collections 590 600 592 
Net Cost 963 973 996 
Savings -10 -32 
$120 Benefit 
UI Benefits 2375 2327 2271 
Subsidy /Bonus 46 77 
Tax Collections 598 610 595 
Net Cost 1777 1762 1752 
Savings 14 24 
$160 Benefit 
UI Benefits 3221 3157 3039 
Subsidy /Bonus 39 72 
Tax Coiiections 606 620 597 
Net Cost 2616 2577 2514 
Savings 39 101 
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Table 18: Cost-Benefit Analysis-White Female 
Control Wage Subsidy Search Bonus 
$80 Benefit 
UI Benefits 1229 1 187 1223 
Subsidy /Bonus 82 132 
Tax Collections 477 461 465 
Net Cost 821 808 890 
Savings 13 -69 
$120 Benefit 
UI Benefits 2008 1845 1850 
Subsidy /Bonus 72 126 
Tax Collections 488 475 468 
Net Cost 1520 1442 1508 
Savings 78 12 
$160 Benefit 
UI Benefits 2753 2538 2484 
Subsidy /Bonus 62 1 19 
Tax Collections 498 487 471 
Net Cost 2255 2113 2132 
Savings 141 22 
The wage subsidy program, on the other hand, is most effective for female and 
minority workers, and typically fares better than the bonus at lower benefit levels. 
The program does not appear to be self-financing for white males, but otherwise it is 
cost effective. 
7. Summary and Conclusions 
Our analysis of the Illinois unemployment insurance experiments provides evidence
that wage subsidies are a viable strategy for reducing unemployment. Our assessment 
differs from that of Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987) who argue that a search bonus 
program would be preferable. We do not dispute that search bonuses, which have 
received favorable notice, can also be effective in reducing unemployment, but only 
that the two programs serve different purposes and exhibit subtle differences in their 
consequences_ 
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Table 19: Cost-Benefit Analysis-White Male 
Control Wage Subsidy Search Bonus 
$80 Benefit 
UI Benefits 1244 1219 1 184 
Subsidy /Bonus 84 143 
Tax Collections 636 637 707 
Net Cost 608 666 621 
Savings -58 -12 
$120 Benefit 
UI Benefits 1929 1891 1793 
Subsidy /Bonus 74 136 
Tax Collections 650 654 713 
Net Cost 1279 1311 1217 
Savings -32 63 
$160 Benefit 
UI Benefits 2650 2598 2409 
Subsidy /Bonus 64 130 
Tax Collections 663 670 718 
Net Cost 1998 1992 1821 
Savings -4 167 
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Search bonuses work primarily by increasing the intensity of search, rather than 
by modifying reservation wage levels or employer demand for labor. UI recipients are 
required by law to register with state employment agencies and to accept "suitable" 
employment, but close monitoring of these requirements is impossible. A search bonus 
is largely an incentive mechanism for persuading UI recipients to do what the law 
requires them to do anyway. It is, perhaps, an effective but unburdensome means for 
enforcing the law. However, it should be realized that search bonuses will largely be 
paid to workers who would find employment in the normal course of events, albeit 
after collecting less unemployment compensation than they currently do. It tends to 
assist those for whom more intensive search is effective, but who are discouraged from 
doing so under the current UI system. 
Wage subsidies, on the other hand, will typically be refused by high wage workers 
who appear reluctant, for whatever reason, to identify themselves as beneficiaries of 
a government assistance program. For low wage workers, particularly those near the 
minimum wage level, who cannot find employment at any wage rate, a wage subsidy 
has distinct advantages over a search bonus. More generally, wage subsidies tend to 
be cost effective because they are paid only to those unemployed workers who use 
them as incentives for employers to hire them. If the subsidy does not assist the 
worker in finding a job, the worker won't utilize the subsidy and it won't be paid. 
It is true that a wage subsidy is less effective in promoting intensive job search, but 
that is not really the primary goal of a subsidy program. 
We would like to argue that low participation rates, far from being a drawback of 
a subsidy program, are one of its primary advantages. Low participation rates make 
subsidy programs appear less effective in simple experimental comparisons, such as 
those reported in the Upjohn report, but our econometric estimates indicate that for 
participants the wage subsidy can be equally or more effective than the search bonus. 
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